personnel, airframes, and maintenance within the combat Aviation Brigades is essential to our continued success in the COIN environment. This essay describes the capabilities, structure, employment of aircraft types, and explores the overall effectiveness of aviation operations in support of COIN. In order to continue aviation's success in COIN the Army must complete transformation of all combat aviation brigades to the medium design and recapitalize the attrition in airframes over the last eight years of war.
ARMY AVIATION FORCE STRUCTURE IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER INSURGENCY
Army Aviation, specifically rotary wing and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are extremely effective in counter insurgency warfare. Army Aviation serves as a combat multiplier by providing intelligence, precision fires, mobility to the force, and a presence over the battlefield. The correct organization template of personnel, airframes, and maintenance within the Combat Aviation Brigades is essential to our continued success in the counter insurgency (COIN) environment.
Army Aviation after the Vietnam era focused training, organizational structure and aircraft acquisitions on the Cold War conventional fight. We built a force to defeat a Soviet armored threat on the plains of Europe. We successfully transformed the AH-1 Cobra helicopter and crews from an effective counter-insurgent platform that performed so well in the jungles of Vietnam into an anti-tank platform for the plains of Europe. We specifically designed and built the AH-64A Apache for the primary purpose of destroying massed armor formations and trained crews for cross forward line of troops (FLOT) deep attacks. 1 The Army built the force structure to conduct surge operations for limited periods of time; just the type of fight we expected in Europe or Korea, and did not anticipate the need for aviation brigades to operate in an environment of sustained and continuous operations. Since our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan started, Army Aviation has flown This trend continued as we built the AH-64D Longbow with its mast mounted radar designed to quickly sort through a target rich battlefield, prioritize targets based on threat, and assign Hellfire missiles to over 100 targets simultaneously. All of this accomplished in a near "auto pilot" mode with hardly any input from the aviator at the controls. This paper will briefly describe the current aviation force structure and how it operates in the COIN environment within the rubric of FM 3-24, our current COIN Army doctrine. The paper will then look at the effectiveness of aviation operations in COIN and how the Army can improve upon our current successes and future opportunities.
This required a tremendous increase in maintenance capability and manning. Dramatic changes in the aviation organizational structures were required to meet this new and prolonged challenge. Cavalry Squadron to handle on its own without augmentation. The CAB provided additional resources to task organize and tailor capabilities to meet these mission demands.
The task force gained an AH-64D company that executed TIC response, C-IED missions along MSR Tampa and provided security to the convoys in the outlying areas of the AO. The AH-64D is well suited for this role due to its precision fire capability with the Hellfire missile and highly accurate 30mm gun. The extended range and speed this aircraft provides allowed it to focus on the outer most areas of the BCT's battle space.
The task force's organic Air Cavalry Troops (OH-58Ds) provided the 24/7 TIC response to the ground maneuver force inside the urban environment of Mosul, this small nimble aircraft is ideal for operations in the city. In addition the OH-58Ds conducted the C-IED fight inside the city with precision fires using the Hellfire missile.
The Air Cavalry Troops played a large role in the city which mitigated their limited fuel endurance and slower airspeed when compared to the AH-64D Apache.
The 
Effectiveness in COIN Operations
We finally have a comprehensive doctrinal manual that describes the COIN environment and overall goals, objectives and methods for success. FM 3-24 provides a foundation to build upon and adapt to the ever changing COIN environment. This manual tells us that killing insurgents, while necessary, especially with respect to extremists by itself cannot defeat an insurgency. 6 Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government's legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency. 7 The military forces' primary function in COIN is protecting the population. 8 When you examine how to protect a population in COIN it becomes apparent that it is more than just a defensive operation. There are many times when the counterinsurgent force must pursue the insurgent offensively. In order for the population to eventually consent to the government's legitimacy and become contributing members of their society we must protect them through stability operations. We are now conducting full spectrum operations defined as simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability operations. The IED threat continues to challenge our force in both OIF and OEF. There are many assets devoted to defeating this threat in an attempt to engage the IED network "left" of the blast. The term "left" of the blast refers to our ability to engage the IED network prior to detonation of the device against our forces. This would entail interdicting IED supplies, locating cache sites, attacking an IED production site, or engaging IED emplacers in the act of emplacement. The teaming of manned (OH-58Ds
and AH-64Ds) and unmanned (Shadow, Predator, ERMP) systems have proven to be particularly effective during the emplacement phase. In order to detect patterns of abnormal life in an insurgency, especially those which function at a slow tempo intelligence, security, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft must maintain persistent watch over the contested area. 15 When coupled with precision fires, this provides great incentive for insurgents to curtail their activity. Hellfire engagements within the confines of the city. Based upon these voice intercepts and the observed actions of insurgent response to approaching aircraft indicates the value of an aviation presence on the battlefield. This presence can be a significant factor in deterrence of insurgent activity.
The insurgent often overestimated the capabilities of the aircraft to our distinct advantage.
Precision fires against targets of opportunity is the ideal mission for AWTs and
SWTs even while they are engaged with providing battlefield presence, convoy security, route reconnaissance, or any of the other myriad of mission sets. A SWT or AWT that is out on the battlefield is often your most responsive means to re-task onto a target of opportunity. A target of opportunity may be a random act of violence picked up by one of our numerous ISR assets or it can be a high value target (HVT) that suddenly presents itself on the battlefield. In either case, time is of the essence and an aircraft already up in the air on a mission set is much more responsive than having to launch a team from a strip alert status. The key is to having a standing set of mission priorities that guide our re-tasking efforts. TIC response is the obvious first priority in most situations. Everything after TIC response the commander can prioritize as necessary.
Crews need to be trained to accept battle hand-offs from a variety of sources such as UAS crews, aerostat crews, joint platforms, and special operations assets that may acquire targets of opportunity.
Defensive
Army Aviation is predominantly an offensive minded organization with aircraft designed for offensive operations. The old adage the best defense is a good offense applies to aviation operations in the COIN environment. However there are some specific defensive contributions that aviation provides when securing the population.
Protecting the population is our first priority in COIN operations. 24 The global trend in urbanization has created dense populations centers throughout the world.
Army Aviation teamed with UAS platforms is ideal to provide reconnaissance and security along the approaches into these urban centers. This is not much different than the screen mission our aviation assets within the Armored Cavalry Regiments or Divisional Cavalry Squadrons conducted for years along the borders of Europe and South Korea. The mobility provided by these vehicular interdiction strike packages greatly increase the ground maneuver commanders battlefield presence throughout the AO.
Examples of this technique include operations in MND-
Convoy security is one of the main staples of aviation operations from a defensive perspective. Services provided by SWT and AWTs range from route reconnaissance looking for IEDs, vehicular borne improved explosive devices (VBIEDs), locating triggermen and providing navigational assistance to convoy commanders. The presence of aircraft over a convoy in itself often serves as deterrence to insurgent attacks.
Stability
Success in stability operations enable the local populace and host nation to resume or develop the capabilities to conduct COIN operations and create conditions that permit U.S. military forces to disengage. 25 The offensive and defensive operations already discussed without question contribute to stability operations by removing the threat or preventing his ability to influence the population. The long term goal is to develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.
26
Army FM 3-07 Stability Operations describes in detail essential stability tasks required for success. Army aviation plays a supporting role in many of these essential tasks. The essential tasks are broken down into primary tasks in which military forces retain primary responsibility. 27 Primary stability tasks aviation supports are the establishment of civil security and restoration of essential services. There is a school of thought that claims rotary wing operations are too vulnerable to modern day small arms fire and will soon be an irrelevant force on the modern battlefield. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are often discounted due to the perceived lack of enemy fire directed at rotary wing aircraft. Reasons for this perceived lack of enemy fire are attributed to the enemy's inability to mass fires effects against aircraft and his inability to acquire modern man portable air defense systems 
38
The loss of the OH-58Ds is particularly acute and will negatively affect the transformation to Medium CABs. We do not have sufficient OH-58D airframes to fill the current organizational structure of the Air Cavalry Squadrons. Combat losses, accidents, and the recently delayed attack reconnaissance helicopter (ARH) program have all contributed to this short fall in OH-58D Kiowa Warriors.
The OH-58D is often the ground commander's airframe of choice in the urban fight. It is well suited for the urban environment due to its small visual signature, excellent visibility from the cockpit, and ability to maneuver in the confined urban terrain.
The OH-58D has a tradition of providing direct support to the ground maneuver commander stemming from their legacy role in the Divisional Cavalry Squadron and the Armored Cavalry Regiments. Close bonds were developed through a mutual dependency between the ground maneuver element and the aviator as they work to develop air ground integration. These same bonds are quickly forming with the attack community (AH-64Ds) as a result of the tactics, techniques, and procedures developing in the current fight.
In order to meet demands of theater we often rotate airframes into units just prior This creates challenges for a community with a very perishable skill set both in the cockpit and in the maintenance shops. The many currency and proficiency requirements for an aviation unit remain regardless of where the unit is in the ARFORGEN process.
Recommendation
The first step however, is to complete the transformation from a mix of Heavy, Light, and Medium CABs to all Medium CABs across the active component. The current Army plan to complete this transformation is on a three year timeline. 39 Today we have 11 active component CABs and are in the process of reorganizing assets to create a 12 th Medium CAB. 40 The current composition of these CABs is 6 Medium, 4
Heavy, and 1 Light CAB for the active component. The 2009 Quadrennial Defense
Review provides specific guidance to increase our rotary wing capability through additional aircraft acquisitions and build a 13 th CAB. 41 In order to transform all 12 and grow the 13 th to a medium structure the shortage of OH-58Ds has to be addressed. Recall from the beginning of the paper the Air Cavalry Squadron consisted of three Air Cavalry Troops of 10 OH-58Ds each for a total of 30 aircraft in a squadron. The only way to complete the transformation without purchasing additional OH-58Ds is to reorganize the Air Cavalry Squadron. The current proposed organizational structure will retain the three Air Cavalry Troops in the squadron with seven aircraft instead of ten per troop thus reducing the squadron from 30 to 21 aircraft. 42 This is a significant reduction in capability. The ACTs with ten aircraft or four SWTs assuming one SWT would be down for maintenance were able to maintain 24 hour continuous coverage with overlap between teams. A single SWT is capable of maintaining coverage for eight hours day or five hours night. This gives you 16 hours of day coverage with two SWTs and ten hours of night coverage with two SWTs. Cutting the air cavalry troop down to seven aircraft will limit you to three SWTs and reduce coverage to less than 24 hours.
In order to mitigate this reduction in 24 hour coverage capability by the Air Cavalry Troop the Air Cavalry Squadron will gain two Shadow UAS platoons of five aircraft each. A well trained and maintained Shadow platoon can maintain 24 hour coverage. This is a significant capability that mitigates the reduction in OH-58D aircraft.
Mitigate is the key word because a Shadow does not bring the same capabilities to the fight as a SWT. The human crewmember in a manned aircraft brings an inquisitive and investigative nature to the table that cannot be replicated in a UAS.
Conclusion
Army Aviation has demonstrated that it is well suited to conduct operations in the COIN environment with great success. In order to maintain this trend we must complete the transformation to all Medium CABs across the Army. The lethality and adaptability of the Medium CAB is unmatched in Army Aviation. The Medium CAB can task organize internally to meet any foreseeable threat we may face to include a conventional force.
The recapitalization and modernization of the aviation force must remain a top priority through completion. Aircraft acquisitions are a long and costly enterprise that cannot wait. This war has elevated air ground integration to unprecedented levels of effectiveness. We now must invest in new airframes to maintain this edge for the future. 
